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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CITY OF SALT LAKE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 9990876 vs. 
KEITH ROBERTS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
oooOooo 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
POINT I 
DESPITE A CHANGE IN WORDING IN THE STATE STATUTE IN 1999, THE 
CITY ORDINANCE REMAINS IN CONFLICT WITH STATE STATUTE. 
Appellant acknowledges a change in wording in the State 
statute governing "lewdness", effective in May, 1999. Prior to May 
of 1999, § 76-9-702 U.C.A. made it an act of lewdness to expose 
"genitals or private parts. . . in a public place. . . " in May of 
1999, the statute was expanded to prohibit exposure of "genitals, 
the female breast below the top of the areola, the buttocks, the 
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anus, or the pubic area. . . . " the statute, however, now prohibits 
the exposure only "under circumstances which the person should know 
would likely cause affront or alarm. . . . " the previous statute 
had been in place in the form cited by Defendant for several years. 
Such a State prohibition was in effect when the City passed its 
ordinance. Nothing about the change supports the City's position 
that the ordinance is not in conflict with State law. In fact, it 
might be argued that the State Legislature found the term "public 
place" to be either unnecessary or too nebulous. The current 
statute does a sufficient job of protecting the public by 
prohibiting exposure in a manner "likely to cause front or alarm". 
The City quotes the case of Patterson v. Utah County Board of 
Adjustment, 893 P. 2d 602 (Utah App. 1995) in support of the 
proposition that all ordinances are valid unless they "do not 
rationally promote the public health, safety, morals and welfare." 
This Court, however, in that case addressed only the extent of 
power delegated to cities. It did not discuss conflicts with State 
statutes. Nothing in that decision altered the fact that the City 
has no power to regulate the same conduct that is regulated by the 
State, in an inconsistent manner. As the Utah Supreme Court said 
in State v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434, 20 Ut.2d 298 (Utah 1968) the city 
has general police power except where the exercise of that police 
power is "prohibited by statute or inconsistent therewith." (1968. 
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UT. 36, 1[2 5 -- versuslaw.com). The City, of course, contends that 
the term "open to public view" prohibits a wider range of conduct 
than does the similar term "in a public place". Defendant contends 
that it is just the opposite. Nevertheless, when neither of the 
terms are defined, a citizen cannot be expected to differentiate 
between the terms. He is thus only required to take reasonable 
precautions to avoid exposure in a manner that he will be seen by 
others who might be offended. Appellee has sought to portray the 
evidence in this case as showing open conduct easily noticeable by 
casual passersby. As has previously been set forth in detail by 
the appellant, the conduct took place against two blank walls 
behind a parked truck. The only way that "casual" passerby could 
"sneak up" and get a look at what was going on, was by crawling 
under the truck. The City's attempt to finesse the ordinance 
cannot support a verdict of "guilty" in this matter. Both the 
State statute and the City ordinance were designed to prohibit the 
same conduct, that of public exposure of body parts which can be 
expected to offend public sensibility. Private conduct is not 
covered. If given enough time and enough authority, the police of 
this State could search out a lot of conduct with which they did 
not agree. Utah, fortunately, is not as widely known for that 
effort as is the State of Georgia. Out of that tendency to snoop 
into people's private lives have come some wonderful cases. In the 
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landmark case of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) the United 
States Supreme Court held that private possession of pornographic 
material could not be criminalized. And in the more recent case of 
Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18, (Ga. 1998) the Supreme 
Court of Georgia found a "right of privacy" in the State 
Constitution sufficient to prohibit the State from criminalizing 
private and consensual sodomy. The Court stated: 
Adults who "withdraw from the public gaze" to engage in 
private unforced sexual behavior are exercising a right 
"embraced within the right of personal liberty." We cannot 
think of any other activity that reasonable persons would rank 
as more private and more deserving of protection from 
governmental interference than unforced, private, adult sexual 
activity. (1998.GA.44286 ^19 -- versuslaw.com). 
This case was not prosecuted because there was exposure in a 
public place. It was prosecuted because the police believed that 
there was sexual conduct taking place, involving someone "they 
recognized [as] a prostitute" (Appellee brief pg.4). In this case, 
however, the City's ordinance which restricts conduct in "public" 
was clearly used to prohibit private conduct of which the police 
officers disapproved. If, in fact, there was a commercial sex act 
occurring, there is indeed a law that prohibits that. 
Unfortunately for the police, they have no proof of it. It is not 
enough to go searching for an ordinance which might be stretched to 
apply, when an officer cannot prove what he believes probably has 
happened. There are simply times when the police must recognize 
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that interference in personal lives must not be tolerated. 
In People v. Legel, 24 111.App.3d 554, 321 N.E.2d 164 (111. 
App. 1974) the Court was faced with a man who undressed and fondled 
himself in the front window of his home "before unveiled glass 
doors, with a light overhead in plain view of the casual observer 
in the neighbor's living room." The Court observed: 
The defendant made no attempt to conceal his activities. To 
the contrary, the evidence reveals that he did everything 
possible in order to expose his lewd acts to others. The 
still photographs substantially collaborate the officer's 
testimony. The evidence is clear, convincing and 
uncontradicted. It leaves no doubt that the defendant's 
intent was to gain sexual gratification by causing shock and 
consternation in those who observed his exhibition. 321 
N.E.2d at 167. 
Once again, the argument was over the term "public place". 
Defendant claimed that his own home could not be a "public place" 
for any purpose. The Court first cited the committee comments of 
the Illinois legislature, in passing the lewdness statute: 
It is the probability of public view that is crucial rather 
than the ownership or use of the particular real estate upon 
which the act occurs. For example, a person standing nude 
before a lighted window of his private apartment at night, 
adjacent to a well traveled public sidewalk would be, for 
purposes of the statute, in a public place. Contrariwise, a 
couple in a parked car on a public right-of-way but in the 
lonely lane might not be in a public place, depending upon the 
likelihood of others traversing this particular area at such 
hours. 321 N.E.2d at 168. 
The Court went on to observe: 
The vantage point of the observer is relevant only insofar as 
it sheds light on the controlling inquiry on whether there was 
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a reasonable expectation that the actor's conduct would be 
viewed by others. The purpose of this section is to protect 
the public from shocking and embarrassing displays of sexual 
activities. 
The duty lies with the deviate to keep his activities private. 
Where the evidence shows that it was reasonably foreseeable 
that the lewd conduct would be viewed by the casual public 
observer, there is a reasonable expectation of public view and 
the acts can be held to have occurred in a "public place" by 
reason of the statutory definition, id. 
The conduct of this Defendant was not that of the Defendant in 
Legel. The officer admitted that he did not think the defendant 
expected to be observed, nor did he wish to be. Obviously 
Defendant did not realize he was being trailed by someone who would 
"sneak" under a truck in order to make the observation. No casual 
observers did, in fact, observe the behavior. Defendant thought 
his conduct was private. The activities of this officer could not 
reasonably have been expected; and Defendant met his duty to the 
public at large. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF VAGUENESS FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL. 
The City contends that Defendant has raised the argument that 
the City disorderly conduct is void for vagueness for the first 
time on appeal. In fact, Defendant does not contend that the 
ordinance is facially invalid for vagueness. He only contends 
that, if the ordinance can be stretched as far as Plaintiff 
contends it can be, it becomes unconstitutionally vague as applied. 
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In fact, Defendant did make the same arguments at trial. It should 
be noted that counsel filed his appearance in behalf of the 
Defendant in the District Court on August 25, 1999. Trial was held 
on August 30. Needless to say, the trial memorandum was written 
quickly. Nevertheless, Defendant did argue the meaning of the 
terms "open to public view" and "in a public place"; and Defendant 
did suggest that the term open to public view could not be 
construed as broadly as the City claimed. That is still the 
essence of Defendant's argument. Defendant has not opened a new 
front by suggesting that the way the City interprets the ordinance 
it so vague that it cannot be reasonably interpreted by those 
seeking to comply with it. 
It is the City that has sought to broaden the issues on 
appeal. At no time in the trial court, did the City set forth its 
legal theory supporting the contention that there was sexual 
conduct between the Defendant and his companion. Sexual conduct is 
clearly defined by State law, in §76-10-1301 (4), cited in 
Defendant's brief. The City never cited their obviously 
inconsistent ordinance at trial. The trial court could not have 
relied on it in finding Defendant guilty. It was obvious that the 
police officer was looking for something that was prohibited by the 
State and City laws against commercial sex. Such prohibition 
includes only the acts prohibited by §76-10-1301. Defendant 
concedes that the officer alleged that he saw the exposed breast 
from further away than he was when he allegedly observed the 
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exposed penis. That does not matter. The officer was in no sense 
a casual passerby. Defendant's statement of facts detail the 
efforts of the officers in which they "snuck around" to approach 
the car unseen. Even conceding what the City now argues, that it 
was not the exposed penis at all, does not change the legal or 
factual situation. 
POINT III 
APPELLEE CITES AN INCORRECT STANDARD IN ITS ARGUMENT THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED. A REMAND FOR RETRIAL MAY 
BE NECESSARY, BECAUSE OF THE FACTUAL QUESTIONS. 
The City, in its brief, cites correct standards of review in 
its initial reference on page one. In Point IV of the brief, 
however, the City argues (in slightly less than one page) that the 
trial court should not be overruled unless its "factual findings" 
are deemed "clearly erroneous". At best, the question is a mixed 
one of fact and law "which, on review, do[es] not require the 
deference due to findings on questions of pure fact." See 
Margulies by Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985) . 
Defendant contends, however, that this is primarily an issue of law 
upon which the trial court is not granted deference at all. At 
issue is the meaning of an ordinance. In making the one page 
argument in Point IV, the City has certainly mischaracterized the 
evidence. The City states "officer Russell while standing in the 
parking lot could see the defendant parked in the car kissing the 
exposed breasts of the women he was with." It is further stated 
that the conduct "occurred in a parking lot where customers of the 
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lounge were walking back and forth to their cars". In fact, the 
conduct did not so occur. The parking lot in which customers may 
have been walking back and forth to their cars, was blocked from 
viewing the Defendant by the presence of the large truck. It is 
indeed difficult to preserve the feel of the evidence as reviewed 
by the District Court, due to the fact that it appeared impossible 
to preserve the drawings (TR 10). Nevertheless, the testimony as 
set forth on pages 4 through 6 of Appellant's previous brief 
clearly shows that Defendant was well away from where customers 
might be. Appellant comes to this Court somewhat frustrated by the 
lack of drawings and other material which might better inform this 
Court of the exact facts of this case. Yes, the Trial Court did 
have some advantage over this Court in reviewing those facts. 
Nevertheless, the Trial Court misconstrued the law, and based its 
decision on a misapplication of that law. Plaintiff states in the 
"standard of review" section of its brief that "a remand is 
unnecessary where undisputed facts allow Appellate Courts to fairly 
and properly resolve the case on the record." In doing so, the 
City cites Flying Diamond Oil v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 
(Utah 1989). Conversely: 
It is generally the law that the failure of a trial court to 
make findings on all material issues necessary to support its 
judgment is an error that usually requires a remand for the 
purpose of allowing the trial court to make such findings. 776 
P.2d at 622. 
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Defendant acknowledges that it may be difficult for this Court 
to envision the circumstances without the drawings made by the 
police officer. It is the right and duty of this Court, however, 
to interpret the law. Defendant believes that the record is 
sufficient to show that he is not guilty of the crime charged. If, 
however, the Court cannot determine that as a matter of law, this 
Court should then set forth the legal standard that the Trial Court 
should use and remand this matter to the Trial Court to review the 
facts once more in light of the proper legal standards. It is not 
sufficient to say that the facts may have been adequate to prove 
Defendant guilty, when it is clear that the Trial Court used the 
wrong legal standards. Defendant asks, of course, that this case 
be reversed and dismissed immediately. In the alternative, 
however, this Court should consider remanding the case for further 
proceedings consistent with its opinion on the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant is entitled to a judgment dismissing the charge 
brought against him. In the alternative, this Court should remand 
this matter for a retrial after correcting the trial court's errors 
of law in interpreting the ordinance at issue. 
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DATED this day of February, 2000. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / n day of February, 2 000, I 
hand delivered two true and correct copies of Appellant's Reply 
Brief to Richard Daynes, Attorney for Appellee, 349 South 200 East, 
Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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